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Abstract
We develop a two-period model where banks invest in reserves and loans, and are
subject to aggregate liquidity shocks. When banks face a a shortage of liquidity, they
can sell loans on the interbank market. Two types of equilibria emerge. In the no
default equilibrium, banks keep enough reserves and remain solvent. In the mixed
equilibrium, some banks default with positive probability. The former equilibrium
exists when credit market competition is intense, while the latter emerges when banks
exercise market power. Thus, competition is beneficial to financial stability. The eﬀect
of default on welfare depends on the exogenous risk of the economy as represented by
the probability of the good state of nature.
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1 Introduction
There is a long and wide standing debate both among academics and policymakers on the
nexus between competition and financial stability. The key issue is how competition aﬀects
banks’ and borrowers’ risk taking behavior. One view is that by reducing banks’ franchise
value, competition reduces the incentives for banks to behave prudently (see, Keeley, 1990,
and the subsequent papers surveyed in Carletti, 2008, and Carletti and Vives, 2009). An
opposite view is that competition is beneficial to financial stability since low loan rates
induce borrowers to take less risk thus reducing the risk of banks’ portofolio (Boyd and
De Nicoló, 2005). Yet, by narrowing lending margins, competition reduces banks’ buﬀers
and thus their ability of withstanding loan losses (Martinez-Miera and Repullo, 2010).
Along with the theoretical literature, the empirical evidence is inconclusive on whether
competition is beneficial or detrimental to financial stability. Results diﬀer across samples
and time periods and very much depend on the estimates used to measure competition
and stability (see the discussion in Carletti, 2010).
Recently, the debate has centered around the question of whether competition has
contributed to the recent financial crisis. One view is that the increased competition
deriving from the process of deregulation of the 1980s and 1990s has exacerbated banks’
risk taking behavior. Another view, supported by the observation that countries with
similar market structures (such as Australia, Canada and the UK) have been aﬀected
very diﬀerently by the recent crisis, suggests that other factors like a proper regulatory
framework and institutional environment can insulate banking systems from risk taking
problems (Carletti, 2010, and Beck et al., 2011).
One issue that has not been explored so far is the link between competition and liquidity
as a source of risk. As the recent crisis has shown, liquidity is a crucial source of risk in
the banking industry because of the maturity transformation function that banks perform
in the economy. When faced with large liquidity demands, banks need to access financial
markets to raise additional liquidity at short notice by either borrowing or selling illiquid
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assets. Market liquidity determines the level of asset prices and thus banks’ ability to
withstand liquidity shocks. When liquidity is scarce, asset prices may be too low for
banks to remain solvent and a liquidity crisis can turn into a solvency problem. Key to
the emergence of liquidity crises are then the amount of reserves that banks hold and
the total supply of liquidity on the market. The former aﬀects individual banks’ need
of additional liquidity; the latter determines market liquidity and thus the level of asset
prices.
In this context, we develop a novel theory where credit market competition aﬀects the
emergence of crises as it determines banks’ incentives to hold reserves, and thus market
liquidity and asset prices. The theory provides numerous new insights into the relationship
between competition and stability. In contrast to the charter value hypothesis described
above, we show that competition is beneficial to financial stability as it induces banks to
behave prudently and hold more liquidity. However, avoiding a liquidity crisis is not always
eﬃcient as it may require the system to hold large amounts of liquid reserves and reduce
credit availability excessively. These results contrast with those in Boyd and De Nicoló
(2005) in that we focus on liquidity risk rather than credit risk as a source of instability,
and we characterize the welfare properties of financial stability.
We build on a standard banking model as developed in Allen and Gale (2004a, 2004b)
and Allen, Carletti and Gale (2009). There are two periods. Banks raise funds from risk-
averse consumers in the form of deposits. On the asset side, they hold a one-period liquid
asset (reserves) or grant a two-period loan to entrepreneurs with a return that depends on
the degree of competition in the credit market. Banks face aggregate uncertainty relative
to their demand for liquidity at the interim date as a stochastic fraction of their consumers
need to consume early. There is a good state with a small fraction of early depositors, and
a bad state where the fraction of early depositors is larger. Banks can meet their liquidity
demands by holding reserves initially or selling loans on a (competitive) interbank market
at the interim period. Holding reserves is costly in terms of foregone return on the loans.
Asset prices are endogenously determined and are volatile across the two states of nature,
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as they depend on the amount of supply and demand for liquidity in the market. The
former is fixed by banks’ total reserve holdings and is thus inelastic at the interim date.
The latter depends on the realization of the liquidity shock and the terms of the deposit
contract. Credit market competition aﬀects liquidity demand and supply as it aﬀects
banks’ portfolio allocation and the terms of the deposit contract. Banks make their initial
investment choices to maximize expected profits subject to the constraint that consumers
are willing to deposit their funds initially.
We first show that two types of equilibria can emerge, depending on the degree of
competition in the credit market. A no default equilibrium emerges when competition is
intense. As loans are not very profitable, the opportunity cost for banks of holding reserves
is low. All banks find it optimal to keep enough reserves to repay the early depositors
in both states of nature. As competition decreases, holding reserves becomes increasingly
more costly and the no default equilibrium ceases to exist. In the new equilibrium, defined
as mixed, banks behave diﬀerently despite being ex ante alike. Some banks, which we call
risky, invest only in loans and default in the bad state of nature when all consumers with-
draw and a bank run occurs. Banks sell then all their loans, asset prices drop significantly
and consumers obtain the liquidation proceeds instead of the promised repayments. The
remaining banks, defined as safe, hold enough liquidity to always meet their commitments
and acquire the loans of the risky banks. In equilibrium, safe and risky banks make the
same expected profits and consumers are indiﬀerent between the two types of banks.
We then show that the degree of competition for which default starts to emerge and the
number of defaulting banks crucially depend on the level of exogenous risk in the economy
as represented by the probability of the bad state of nature. When such probability is low,
default is unlikely to occur and more banks have incentives to reduce their reserve holdings.
Thus, in normal times when the economy is characterized by a more stable environment,
crises are less frequent but are more severe in that they involve a larger number of banks
and emerge in more competitive credit markets. In contrast, in economies characterized
by greater exogenous risk, banks prefer to behave prudently. Fewer banks behave risky
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and default only occurs when banks exercise enough market power. These results suggest
that credit market competition and exogenous risk are substitutes in terms of their impact
on banks’ risk taking behavior.
A final important insight of the model concerns the optimality of crises. We show
that default is socially optimal when the exogenous risk in the economy is low, and it is
ineﬃcient when such a risk is high. Default introduces some contingency in the repay-
ments to depositors and some elasticity in the demand for liquidity at the interim period.
Consumers at the safe banks always receive the promised consumption, where those at
the risky banks receive the promised repayments in the good state and the liquidation
proceeds in the bad state. In this state, risky banks need to sell all their loans, and their
demand for liquidity becomes elastic to the price. Despite going default, risky banks have
to make the same expected profits as the safe banks in equilibrium. When the probability
of the bad state is high, the total demand for liquidity at the interim date is greater with
default than without and the system must hold more reserves to satisfy it. This leads to a
lower supply of loans in aggregate and thus to lower welfare. The opposite happens when
the probability of the bad state is low.
The key feature of the model is that there is a wedge between the loan return accruing to
banks and the return from holding reserves. The magnitude of such a wedge is determined
by the level of competition in the credit market. The less competitive the credit market,
the more profitable loans are and the more costly holding reserves is. Any other factor
aﬀecting the diﬀerence in the profitability of loans and reserves is consistent with our story.
For example, banks granting loans to more profitable industries have a higher opportunity
cost of holding reserves and are therefore more prone to behave risky. Similarly, highly
leveraged banks are able to obtain higher returns from their investments and have therefore
lower incentives to insure themselves against liquidity shocks.
The paper has a number of empirical implications. First, it predicts that banks in
competitive banking systems behave more prudently than banks in less competitive sys-
tems. Second, systems with similar levels of competition are more likely to be unstable
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when banks are less subject to large liquidity shocks. Third, crises occuring in systems
with low expectations of large liquidity shocks are more severe in terms of number of de-
faulting banks but also more eﬃcient as they allow the economy to provide a larger supply
of loans. Fourth, economies with a small probability of high liquidity shocks are more
eﬃcient than economies with a high probability of large liquidity shocks, even when they
entail default. Finally, the model predicts that default leads to greater credit availability,
except in banking systems with high exogenous risk.
The novelty of the paper is to analyze the relationship between competition and liq-
uidity risk, and to show that liquidity crises can be eﬃcient. In this sense, it is linked to
various strands of literature. A few papers have looked at the eﬀect of competition on
bank instability in terms of runs (see also Carletti, 2008, and Carletti and Vives, 2009,
for a survey). The analysis of Rochet and Vives (2004) and Goldstein and Pauzner (2005)
suggests that when banks oﬀer higher repayments to early depositors (as would be the
case with more intense competition on the deposit market), bank runs are more likely
to occur as a result of coordination failures. Matutes and Vives (1996) show that de-
posit market competition does not have a clear eﬀect on banks’ vulnerability to runs, but
higher promised repayments to depositors tend to make banks more unstable. Carletti et
al. (2007) analyze the impact of credit market competition on banks’ incentives to hold
liquidity after a merger. They show that an increase in market power as after a merger
among large banks increases banks’ liquidity needs and thus the probability of liquidity
crises. In contrast to these papers, we focus on the impact of credit market competition
and banks’ holdings in a framework where runs are due to deterioration of asset prices
rather than to depositors’ coordination failures.
Our paper shows that competition is beneficial to financial stability but not necessarily
to eﬃciency. The reason is that default is socially desirable if it leads to a decrease in
the amount of reserves in the system and thus to greater credit availability. The idea that
crises can be eﬃcient is related to that in Allen and Gale (1998) that bank runs can be
eﬃcient as they improve risk sharing between early and late depositors. Similarly, Boyd,
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De Nicoló and Smith (2004) shows that competitive banking systems are more esposed to
crises than monopolistic ones, but are more eﬃcient as they provide better inter-temporal
insurance to depositors. This contrasts with the result that competition exacerbates risk
taking and thus lowers welfare by either leading to excessive deposit rates (Matutes and
Vives, 2000) or by worsening the average quality of banks’ borrowers (Freixas et al., 2011).
Several recent contributions on financial stability have focused on crises generated from
asset price volatility and fire sales losses. Examples are Acharya and Yorulmazer (2008),
Acharya, Shin and Yorulmazer (2011) Diamond and Rajan (2011) and, in particular, Allen
and Gale (1994, 2004a, 2004b), and Allen and Carletti (2006, 2008). We contribute to
this literature by analyzing how competition aﬀects asset prices and thus the emergence
of liquidity crises.
We show that the presence of competitive interbank markets supports the existence of
a mixed equilibrium where some banks default in one state of nature and sell their loans to
other banks at a price that is endogenously determined by demand and supply of liquidity.
This mixed equilibrium can be eﬃcient or ineﬃcient depending on the amount of total
liquid reserves that are needed to clear the market. In this sense, the paper is related to
some contributions that focus on the interbank market such as Flannery (1996), Freixas
and Jorge (2008) and Acharya, Gromb and Yorulmazer (2011).
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 derives the
no default and the mixed equilibria. Section 4 looks at the eﬃciency properties of the two
equilibria. Section 5 discusses the main implications of the model. Section 6 concludes.
All proofs are in the appendix.
2 The model
Consider a three date (t = 0, 1, 2) economy with three types of agents: banks, consumers
and entrepreneurs. Banks raise funds from consumers in exchange for a deposit contract
and provide loans to entrepreneurs. Banks enjoy monopoly power in the deposit market
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while they compete to attract entrepreneurs. The idea is that banks operate in distinct
regions. Consumers can only deposit their funds at one bank in their region. Entrepreneurs
obtain loans from one bank only but can move across regions.
Each bank raises funds at date 0 from a continuum of mass one of consumers endowed
with one unit at date 0 and nothing thereafter. Consumers are all ex ante identical but
are either early or late types ex post. The former value consumption only at date 1; the
latter value consumption only at date 2. Each consumer has a probability of being an
early type  given by
 =
⎧
⎨
⎩
 w. pr. 
 w. pr. (1− )
with   . From the Law of Large Numbers,  represents the fraction of early types
at each bank. As there is only aggregate uncertainty, the realization of  is the same for
all banks. Thus, there are two states of nature,  and , which we refer to as the good
and the bad state respectively.
The ex ante uncertainty about consumers’ types generates a role for banks as liquidity
providers. Consumers are oﬀered a deposit contract allowing them to withdraw a (non-
contingent) amount 1 at date 1 or 2 at date 2 and have an expected utility equal to
[(1 2 )] = [(1) + (1− )(2)].
The utility function is twice diﬀerentiable and satisfies the usual neoclassical assumptions:
0()  0 00()  0 and lim→0 0(0) =∞. For the consumers to deposit their endowment
at a bank at date 0, the contract has to guarantee them an expected utility at least equal
to the one they would obtain from storing.
Each bank invests a fraction  of its funds in reserves and a fraction  in loans to
entrepreneurs at the initial date. Reserves are a storage technology: one unit invested at
date  produces one unit at date  + 1. Loans are a long technology: one unit invested
at date 0 gives a return  to the bank at date 2. Such a return depends on the degree of
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competition in the credit market. Entrepreneurs invest the amount obtained by the bank
in a (safe) divisible project yielding   1 at date 2 and pay the bank a (gross) interest
rate equal to
 =  . (1)
The parameter ( 1  1) measures the intensity of competition in the credit market. The
higher  the lower the degree of competition and the higher the return  accruing to the
bank. In the limit as  → 1 , the credit market is perfectly competitive. The bank receives
 = 1 and the entrepreneur retains  . At the other extreme, when  → 1, the credit
market is monopolistic and the bank obtains  →  . Entrepreneurs are still willing to
take the loan as they are assumed to have a zero opportunity cost. Values of  between 1
and 1 represent intermediate levels of competition in the credit market, when banks and
entrepreneurs share the surplus generated by the project. In this sense, the parameter 
can be seen as capturing the bank’s bargaining power over entrepreneurs.
Loans can be sold on a (competitive) interbank market at date 1 for a price . Partic-
ipation in this market is limited in that only banks can buy and sell loans. The price  is
endogenously determined in equilibrium by the aggregate demand and supply of liquidity
in the market, as explained further below. As there are only two states  = , the price
 can take at most two values.
The timing of the model is as follows. At date 0, banks choose the deposit contract
(1 2) and the initial portfolio allocation between reserves and loans in order to maximize
their expected profits. At the beginning of date 1, consumers learn privately their type
and the state  =  is realized. Early consumers always demand 1 at date 1 to meet
their consumption needs. In contrast, late consumers can either wait and demand the
promised consumption 2 at date 2, or claim to be early types and demand 1 at date 1,
thus precipitating a run. In the absence of runs, a fraction  of consumers are paid 1
at date 1 and the remaining fraction 1 −  are paid 2 at date 2. In the presence of a
run, the bank has to sell all its loans and it goes bankrupt, and consumers receive a pro
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rata share of the bank’s resources. A run occurs in the model only when the value of the
bank’s portfolio at date 2 is not enough to repay at least 1 to the late consumers. That
is, (sunspot) runs do not occur.
3 Equilibrium
Two equilibria arise endogenously in the model. In the first, that we define as no default
equilibrium, runs do not occur and all banks remain solvent in both states  = . In
the second, defined as mixed equilibrium, some banks experience a run and go bankrupt
in some state, while some others always remain solvent. In what follows we characterize
the two equilibria in turn. We first solve the bank’s problem in each equilibrium. Then,
we analyze for which parameter space, and in particular for which level of competition in
the credit market, the two equilibria exist. We start with the no default equilibrium.
3.1 The no default equilibrium
The no default equilibrium exists when all consumers withdraw according to their time
preferences so that runs do not occur and all banks remain solvent. As they are all ex
ante identical and there is no default, banks behave alike at the initial date concerning
both their portfolio allocation and the terms of the deposit contract. Each bank chooses
the deposit contract (1 2) and the portfolio allocation () simultaneously so as to
maximize its expected profit at  = 0. The bank’s maximization problem is then given by
12Π = + (− 1) + (1− )(− 1)− [(1− ) + (1− )(1− )]2 (2)
subject to
+  = 1 (3)
1 ≤  (4)
(1− )2 ≤ +− 1 (5)
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2 ≥ 1 (6)
[(1 2 )] = [ + (1− ) ](1) + [(1− ) + (1− )(1− )](2) ≥ (1)
(7)
0 ≤  ≤ 1 1 ≥ 0
for any  = . Bank’s profit Π is given by sum of the returns from the loans  and
the expected excess of liquidity ( − 1) + (1 − )( − 1) minus the expected
payments [(1−)+(1−)(1−)]2 to depositors at date 2. Constraint (3) represents
the budget constraint at date 0 The next two constraints are the resource constraints at
dates 1 and 2. Constraint (4) requires that the bank has enough resources at date 1 to
satisfy the demands 1 by the early consumers for any  = . Constraint (5) requires
that the resources +− 1 available to the bank at date 2 are enough to repay the
promised amount (1− )2 to the late consumers. Constraint (6) ensures that at date 0
the late consumers are oﬀered a repayment 2 at least equal to 1. Taken together, (5) and
(6) imply that the deposit contract is incentive compatible both at dates 0 and 1 so that
no run occurs. Constraint (7) is consumers’ participation constraint at date 0. It requires
that the utility [(1 2 )] that they receive from the deposit contract is at least equal
to the utility (1) that they would obtain from storing their endowment. Finally, the last
constraint is simply a non-negative requirement for reserves and consumption bundles.
In what follows, we assume that depositors have a logaritmic utility function, that is
() = ln() with  = 1 2. This simplifies the analysis and allows us to obtain closed
form solutions, without aﬀecting our qualitative results. We have the following.
Proposition 1 There exists a unique (symmetric) no default equilibrium, in which each
bank invests an amount  = 1 in reserves and  = 1− in loans, and it
oﬀers consumers a deposit contract
1 =
µ + (1− )
 + ( − )
¶(1−)+(1−)(1−)
 1 (8)
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and
2 =
µ + ( − )
 + (1− )
¶+(1−)
 1 (9)
The intuition behind Proposition 1 is simple. In the no default equilibrium all banks
behave alike. Each bank finds it optimal to hold an amount of reserves just enough to satisfy
its highest liquidity demand 1 by early consumers at date 1 in state . The deposit
contract maximizes the bank’s expected profit while satisfying consumers’ participation
constraint with equality. Depositors always receive the promised repayments 2  1 .
Holding reserves entails an opportunity cost for banks as represented by the foregone
return  on loans. Such a cost is higher the more intense is competition in the credit
market. This implies that the consumption 1 falls with  (and thus with ) while
2 increases. The ratio between 2 and 1 , as given by +(−)+(1−) , increases
as competition decreases in a way to guarantee that consumers’ participation constraint
remains satisfied.
Substituting (8) and (9) into the expression for the bank’s expected profit as in (2),
we obtain
Π =  − 2 . (10)
The bank’s profit is simply equal to the diﬀerence between the return on the loans and the
promised repayment 2 to the late consumers. This means that the reserve holdings and
the liquidity demand by the early consumers aﬀect the bank’s profits only to the extent
that they aﬀect 2 .
Since all banks hold enough reserves to self-insure themselves against liquidity shocks
and there is only aggregate uncertainty in the model, no loans are traded on the interbank
market at date 1. Still, the equilibrium allocation must be supported by a vector of prices
that satisfies the market clearing conditions. These require that the total demand for
liquidity does not exceed the total supply of liquidity for any state . Both demand and
supply are inelastic at date 1. The demand for liquidity is inelastic since it is determined
solely by consumers’ preferences. The supply is fixed by the bank’s portfolio decisions at
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date 0. Shocks to the demand cause price volatility across states. Since    and
 = 1 , there is an excess of liquidity in state  and date 1. Thus, it must hold
that
 =  (11)
for banks to be indiﬀerent between buying loans and storing the excess liquidity between
dates 1 and 2. With    loans would dominate storage between dates 1 and 2, while
   would imply the opposite.
The price  must ensure that banks are willing to hold both reserves and loans
between dates 0 and 1. This means that  must satisfy
  + (1− )

 = . (12)
Given   1, this implies   1 Otherwise loans would dominate reserves at date
0. The equilibrium is characterized by price volatility as a consequence of the aggregate
uncertainty of the demand for liquidity and the inelasticity of supply at date 1.
3.2 The mixed equilibrium
So far we have considered the equilibrium where no banks default. However, avoiding
default is costly as it requires banks to hold a large enough amount of reserves and forego
the higher return on the loans. As competition in the credit market decreases, the oppor-
tunity cost of holding reserves becomes high, and banks can find it optimal to reduce their
reserve holdings and default at date 1 with positive probability. In this section, we char-
acterize the equilibrium when default becomes optimal. We start by looking at the banks’
problem. Then, we analyze the market clearing conditions supporting the equilibrium.
A bank defaults when its late consumers run at date 1 and the price  drops enough
to generate insolvency. In equilibrium not all banks can default simultaneously. If all
banks made the same investments at date 0 and all defaulted at date 1, there would be
no bank willing to buy the loans of the defaulting banks so that  = 0. This cannot be
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an equilibrium since it would be optimal for a bank to remain solvent and buy the loans
at the price  = 0. This implies an equilibrium with default must be mixed.
Despite being ex ante identical, banks diﬀer in terms of initial portfolio allocations and
deposit contracts. A fraction  of banks, that we define as safe, invest enough in reserves
at date 0 to remain solvent at date 1 in either state  =  for any . The remaining
1 −  banks, defined as risky, invest so much in loans that they may not have enough
reserves to satisfy consumers’ liquidity demands at date 1. When this is the case, risky
banks sell their loans on the interbank market at the price  and default with positive
probability. In equilibrium safe and risky banks must have the same expected profits as
they have to be indiﬀerent between being either of the two types. This implies that the
risky banks can default only in one state.
Given the structure of the model, they remain solvent in state  =  and default in
state  = . Even if they sell part of their loans, the price  is high enough for them to
meet their commitments. In state , they are unable to do so as there is a self-reinforcing
drop in the price  . Anticipating the default, late consumers at the risky banks run.
This forces the risky banks to sell all their loans. The larger demand for liquidity relative
to state  coupled with the inelasticity of the supply drives down the price  to a level
that is too low for the risky banks to remain solvent. This means that default occurs as a
consequence of the endogenous determination of market prices. Consumers know the type
of banks they deposit their endowment in. Safe and risky banks oﬀer diﬀerent deposit
contracts so as to satisfy consumers’ participation constraint.
We start by characterizing the problem for the safe banks. This is similar to the one
in the no default equilibrium, with the diﬀerence that banks have now the possibility to
buy loans on the interbank market at date 1. Given the market prices  and , each
safe bank chooses simultaneously the deposit contract (1  2 ) the amount of reserves 
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and of loans  so as to solve the following problem:
max
1 2  
Π = +(
 − 1
 )+(1−)(
 − 1
 )−[(1−)+(1−)(1−)]

2
(13)
subject to
 +  = 1
1 ≤  (14)
(1− )2 ≤ 
µ
 + 
 − 1

¶
(15)
2 ≥ 1 (16)
[(1  2  )] = [ + (1− ) ](1) + [(1− ) + (1− )(1− )](2) ≥ 0
(17)
0 ≤  ≤ 1 1 ≥ 0
The expression for the bank’s profit Π is given by the sum of the returns from the loans
 and from the expected excess of liquidity (−1 ) and (1 − )(
−1 ) in
states  and  minus the expected payments [(1 − ) + (1 − )(1 − )]2 to late
consumers at date 2. Safe banks use any excess liquidity at date 1 to acquire loans from
the risky banks. With probability  the safe bank has  − 1 units of excess liquidity
and buys 
−1 units of loans from the risky banks yielding a per-unit return of . The
same happens in state . The first constraint is the budget constraint at date 0, which
is always satisfied with equality to indicate that the bank invests all its funds. Constraint
(14) states that the safe bank must have enough reserves  to satisfy the demand 1
by the early consumers at date 1 in either state . Constraint (15) requires that the
bank has enough resources at date 2 to repay the promised amount (1− )2 to the late
consumers. Constraint (16) ensures that the deposit contract is incentive compatible at
date 0. Together with (15), it guarantees that the safe banks never experience a run at date
1. Constraint (17) guarantees that consumers are willing to deposit their funds at date 0.
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The last constraint is the usual non-negative requirement on reserves and consumption.
The risky banks solve a similar problem except that they default in state . In
state  they may have to sell loans at the price  to satisfy consumers’ demands, but
remain solvent and make positive profits. In state  they sell all loans at the price  .
As this price is low, they go bankrupt. Early and late consumers share the proceeds
 +   1 of the liquidated portfolio. Thus, anticipating default when  = ,
each risky bank oﬀers the deposit contract (1  2 ) and chooses the amounts of reserves
 and loans  to solve the following problem:
max
1 2 
Π = 
µ
 − (

1 −
 )− (1− )

2
¶
(18)
subject to
 +  = 1
1 ≤  +  (19)
(1− )2 ≤ 
µ
 − 

1 −

¶
(20)
2 ≥ 1 (21)
[(1  2  )] = [(1 ) + (1− )(2 )] + (1− )[( + )] ≥ 0 (22)
0 ≤  ≤ 1 1 ≥ 0
The risky banks make positive profits only with probability  when state  occurs. These
are equal to the returns from the initial investment in loans  minus the foregone
return  on the (1 − ) units of loans sold at date 1 to cover the shortage of liquidity
1 −  and the expected repayments (1 − )2 to the late consumers. The first
constraint is the usual budget constraint at date 0, which always binds. The second
constraint is the resource constraint in state  at date 1. It states that the maximum
amount + of available resources from reserves and all liquidated loans is enough
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to satisfy the demands 1 by the early consumers. Constraint (20) ensures that at date
2 the bank has enough resources in state  to honor the promised repayments (1− )2
to the late consumers. These two constraints must hold with strict inequality in order
for the risky banks to make positive profits in state . As usual, the deposit contract
has to satisfy the incentive constraint for the late consumers at date 0 as indicated by
(21). Constraint (22) requires the deposit contract to satisfy consumers’ participation
constraint. As the risky banks default in state , consumers receive (1  2 ) only in state
 and the proceeds  +  of the bank’s liquidated portfolio in state . The last
constraint is the usual non-negative requirement.
As mentioned above, in equilibrium banks have to be indiﬀerent between being safe or
risky. This requires the expected profits of safe and risky banks to be the same, that is
Π = Π. (23)
It remains to determine the prices  and , and the fractions  and 1 −  of safe
and risky banks. The solutions to the banks’ maximization problems must be consistent
with the market clearing conditions determining  and .
Consider first state . Market clearing requires that at date 1 the demand for liquidity
equals the supply of liquidity in aggregate. Thus, it must be the case that
(1− )(1 −) = ( − 1 ). (24)
The left hand side represents the aggregate liquidity demand as given by the liquidity
shortage 1 − of each of the 1−  risky banks. The right hand side is the aggregate
liquidity supply as determined by the excess liquidity  − 1 of each of the  safe
banks. Condition (24) requires  ≤  so as to guarantee that the safe banks are willing
to use their excess liquidity to purchase loans from the risky banks.
Now consider state . The risky banks sell their (1−) loans at the price  , while
the safe banks have ( − 1 ) excess of liquidity in total. Market clearing requires
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the supply and demand to be equal at the price  . Thus, it must be the case that
(1− ) = ( − 1 ) (25)
Conditions (24) and (25) imply that there is cash-in-the-market pricing in the model.
The prices  and  vary endogenously across the two states and depend on the supply
and demand of liquidity in the market.
The mixed equilibrium is characterized by the vector { 1  2    1  2    }
We have the following result.
Proposition 2 The mixed equilibrium is characterized as follows:
1. The safe banks invest an amount  in reserves and  = 1 −  in loans, and
oﬀer consumers a deposit contract (1  2 ) as follow
 = 1 + 1−    (26)
1 =
µ

 + (1− )
 + ( − )
¶(1−)+(1−)(1−)
 1 (27)
2 =
µ 

 + ( − )
 + (1− )
¶+(1−)
 1 (28)
2. The risky banks invest an amount
 = 0
in reserves and  = 1 in loans, and oﬀer consumers a deposit contract (1  2 ) such that
1 =  

2 (29)
2 = 

2 − (1− )
  1 (30)
18
3. The price 1 ≤  ≤  is the solution to (22), while  is given by
 = (1− ) −   1 (31)
4. The fraction of safe banks is
 = 

1 − 
1 −  + ( − )1
 1 (32)
The proposition shows that safe and risky banks behave quite diﬀerently. Each safe
bank holds an amount 1−  of reserves in excess of the early liquidity demand 1
in state , and uses it to purchase the loans (1 − ) sold by the risky banks. As in
the no default equilibrium, the safe banks oﬀer 2  1  1 and always remain solvent.
Both repayments depend now on the loan return as well as the market prices since the
interbank market is active.
The risky banks do not hold any reserves and default at date 1 in state . As default
is anticipated and   1, they find it optimal to invest everything in loans at date 0. At
date 1 in state  the risky banks sell 1 units of loans to satisfy the liquidity demand
1 of the early depositors but remain solvent. In state  they liquidate their entire
portfolio and default. Depositors at the risky banks receive the promised repayments 1
and 2 in state  only. These repayments, together with the amount  that consumers
receive in state , have to satisfy their participation constraint.
Default introduces volatility in consumption across banks. The ratio of the consump-
tion levels oﬀered by the two types of banks is given by
2
1
=


 + ( − )
 + (1− ) 
2
1
=


since   1 and +(−)+(1−)  1. This means that the safe banks oﬀer a more volatile
deposit contract than the risky banks. Both banks find it optimal to reduce the liquidity
needed at date 1. The cost of holding liquidity is the foregone return  on the loans for
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the safe banks and  for the risky banks, as they obtain liquidity at date 1 by selling
their loans. Given   1, obtaining liquidity in the market at date 1 is less costly than
holding reserves initially. Thus, the risky banks find it optimal to oﬀer a less volatile
deposit contract than the safe banks.
The prices  and  satisfy the market clearing conditions in each state. The ex-
pression (31) for  is equivalent to (12) in the no default equilibrium. It ensures that
the safe banks are willing to hold both reserves and loans between dates 0 and 1. Given
that the aggregate of supply of liquidity ( − 1 ) is greater in state  than in state
, it must be the case that   1   . As before, the price volatility crucially depends
on the aggregate uncertainty of the liquidity demand and the inelasticity of the supply
at date 1. The diﬀerence is that the demand for liquidity is no longer driven entirely by
consumers’ preferences. In state , when a run occurs, the total demand for liquidity is
(1 − ) as all consumers at the risky banks withdraw and receive the proceeds of the
liquidated portfolio as given by  .
Finally, the proportion  of safe banks is always positive and smaller than one given
that   . Thus, the model generates partial default in that only a group of banks
experience a run and go bankrupt.
3.3 Existence of equilibria
Now that we have characterized the two equilibria of the model, we analyze the parameter
space in which they exist. The key element for the existence of the equilibria is whether
default is optimal. This depends on the opportunity cost of holding reserves, and thus
on the parameter  representing the degree of competition in the credit market. The no
default equilibrium, as characterized in Proposition 1, exists if and only if no bank finds
it optimal to choose a diﬀerent portfolio allocation and deposit contract that results in
default in state . The mixed equilibrium, as characterized in Proposition 2, exists if and
only if neither safe banks nor risky banks prefer portfolio allocations and deposit contracts
that do not support default. For default to be sustained as an equilibrium, safe banks
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must be willing to hold excess liquidity at date 0 and use it to buy loans in the interbank
market at date 1. This is verified if and only if the price  is admissible.
Existence of the no default equilibrium
In the no default equilibrium banks hold an amount of reserves  = 1 . This
allows them to remain solvent in any state  but at the cost of foregoing the higher return
 on the loans. Such a cost is higher the lower is the level of competition in the credit
market. As  increases, it may become optimal for a bank to lower its reserves so as to
appropriate the higher returns on the loans. Thus, the no default equilibrium exists if no
bank finds it optimal to default in state .
A deviating bank chooses reserves , loans  and a deposit contract (1  2 ) so as
to maximize
max
1 2 
Π = 
∙
 − (

1 −
 )− (1− )

2
¸
(33)
subject to
 +  = 1
1 ≤  + 
(1− )2 ≤ 
µ
 − 

1 −

¶
2 ≥ 1
[(1  2  )] = [(1 ) + (1− )(2 )] + (1− )[( + )] ≥ 0 (34)
0 ≤  ≤ 1 1 ≥ 0
The deviating bank makes positive profit only in state . With probability  it obtains
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the return  from the initial investment in loans minus the foregone return  on the
(
1 − ) loans sold at date 1 if  −   0 and the repayments (1 − )2 to the
late consumers at date 2. The first constraint is the usual resource constraint at date 0.
The next two constraints are the resource constraints at dates 1 and 2 in state . They
both must hold with strict inequality for the deviating bank to make positive profits in
state . The next constraint is the usual incentive compatibility constraint at date 0.
Constraint (34) is consumers’ participation constraint at date 0 The last constraint is the
usual non-negative requirement.
The maximization problem has a simple solution as summarized in the following
lemma.
Lemma 1 The deviating bank invests an amount  = 1 in loans and oﬀers all consumers
a repayment  = ()−( 1− ).
The deviating bank behaves similarly to a risky bank in the mixed equilibrium in that
it chooses not to hold any reserves. The diﬀerence is that the market prices are still  = 
and  as in (12) given that unilateral deviations do not aﬀect them. This implies that
obtaining liquidity on the market in state  is costless and the deviating bank oﬀer the
same repayment to early and late consumers as this minimizes its costs of funds.
The no default equilibrium exists as long as deviating is not profitable, that is as long
as Π ≥ Π. We have the following result.
Proposition 3 If the probability  of state  is greater than some cutoﬀ value , there
exists a degree of credit market competition ∗ ∈ ( 1  1) such that the no default equilibrium
exists for any  ≤ ∗.
The proposition shows that the no default equilibrium exists when competition is
intense. The reason is that a high degree of competition implies a low cost of avoiding
default and it makes it optimal for banks to hold a high level of reserves. In other words,
when  is low, the returns on loans in state  are too low to compensate banks for the
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default in state . By contrast, as  increases, the loan rate  becomes high enough to
make the deviation profitable. The high enough value of  required in the proposition
ensures that deviating is profitable at least when  → 1 and thus implies the existence of
∗ in the interval ( 1  1).
Existence of the mixed equilibrium
The mixed equilibrium as characterized in Proposition 2 exists if and only if neither
safe banks nor risky banks choose portfolio allocations and deposit contracts that are not
consistent with the occurrence of default in state . This requires that the price  is
admissible. The price  must lie in the interval
1   ≤  (35)
The lower bound is consistent with   1, while the upper bound ensures that the safe
banks are willing to buy loans at date 1. From (31), the price  is always admissible as
it adjusts with  so as to guarantee that safe banks hold reserves at date 0. Thus, only
(35) matters for the existence of the mixed equilibrium. We have the following result.
Proposition 4 The mixed equilibrium exists for any  ≥ ∗, with ∗ ∈ ( 1  1).
Proposition 4 states that the mixed equilibrium only exists when competition is not
intense. A level of  ≥ ∗ makes it no longer optimal to avoid default as the foregone
return on loans is high. The risky banks choose to default in state . The high returns
on loans in state  are enough to ensure that they are able to make the same expected
profits as the safe banks for an admissible value of . For   ∗, loans are not profitable
enough to guarantee the existence of the two groups of banks for an admissible value of
.
Taken together, Propositions 3 and 4 show that the existence of the two equilibria is
continuous in the parameter  representing the degree of competition in the credit market.
The two equilibria coexist at  = ∗. The intuition is that as  reaches ∗, it becomes
profitable for a bank to deviate and lower its reserves. As all banks are alike, some other
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banks have an incentive to do the same. Then the mixed equilibrium with  safe banks
and 1−  risky banks arises. This implies that at  = ∗ all banks have the same profits
(Π = Π = Π = Π) and the deposit contract is the same for the banks defaulting
and for those not defaulting ( = 1 = 2  1 = 1 and 2 = 2 ). The equality in
the promised consumption 1 = 1 implies that each safe bank keeps a larger amount
of reserves than a bank in the no default equilibrium, as it appears from comparing (26)
and (40).
Comparative statics
The range of  characterizing the existence of the two equilibria of the model depends
on the probability  of state , which can be interpreted as a measure of risk in the
economy in that higher values of  correspond to a lower probability of the bad state. To
see this, we analyze the threshold value ∗ as a function of the parameter . We have the
following.
Proposition 5 The threshold ∗ decreases with  (i.e., ∗  0).
The proposition states that the range of  in which default is observed in equilibrium
becomes larger as  increases. The reason is that as  increases, the good state is more
likely and thus deviation becomes more profitable for any given . This has also an
implication on the fraction of banks in the economy taking risk, as the following proposition
illustrates.
Proposition 6 The number of non defaulting banks ∗ at  = ∗ decreases with  (i.e.,
∗
  0).
As an increase in the probability of the good state makes deviation more profitable, it
will lead to a higher fraction of risky banks in the economy at the level of competition at
which default starts to emerge in equilibrium.
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4 Welfare
Propositions 3 and 4 have important implications for the relationship between credit mar-
ket competition and bank stability. When competition is intense, only the no default
equilibrium exists. As competition decreases and  reaches the level ∗, the mixed equilib-
rium starts to exist. The range of  in which default occurs increases with the probability
 of the low liquidity shock. As  increases, default will be observed less frequently but
at more intense levels of competition.
The number 1−  of banks defaulting also changes with . Since behaving as a risky
bank becomes more profitable as  increases, more banks will optimally choose to default.
Thus, when the economy becomes less exposed to bad states, default will occur less often
but it will involve a larger number of banks.
One important question concerns the impact of default on welfare. The interbank
market allows banks in need of liquidity to obtain it at date 1 by selling loans, and those
with liquidity in excess to use it to purchase loans at the price . The risky banks
can invest more in loans initially and the safe banks have a lower opportunity cost of
holding reserves. Default introduces some elasticity in the demand for liquidity at date
1. Without default, all banks oﬀer non-contingent contracts to consumers and both the
demand for and the supply of liquidity at date 1 are inelastic. The former depends only on
the realization of the liquidity shocks. The latter is fixed by the initial holding of reserves.
With default, the demand for liquidity becomes elastic and the repayment to consumers
are state contingent. Safe banks pay the non-contingent amount 1 to the early consumers
in both states. The risky banks pay the promised repayment 1 to the early consumers
in state  but only the value of the liquidated portfolio  to all consumers in state .
This implies that the total demand for liquidity in state  becomes elastic as it depends
on the market price  .
The state contingency of the total demand for liquidity with default has a crucial eﬀect
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on welfare. To see why consider the expression for welfare as given by
 =  − 2 + ( − )(1−) (36)
in the no default equilibrium, and by
 =  − 2 + ( − )
£
(1− ) + (1−)¤ (37)
=  − 2 + ( − )
£
(1− )¤
in the mixed equilibrium. In both cases, welfare equals the sum of banks’ expected profits
and entrepreneurs’ surplus only, since consumers always have zero expected utility.
To evaluate the impact of default, we focus on the level of competition  = ∗ where
the no default and the mixed equilibria coexist. To simplify notation, in what follows we
use the subscript  to refer to a non- defaulting bank at  = ∗ in either the no default
or the mixed equilibrium; and the subscript  to refer to either a deviating bank in the
default equilibrium or a risky bank in the mixed equilibrium at  = ∗. We have the
following result.
Lemma 2 At  = ∗, welfare is lower with default if
  1 , (38)
and it is higher otherwise.
The lemma states that the impact of default on welfare depends on the comparison
between the repayment  accruing to all consumers at a risky bank and that to the
early consumers at a non-defaulting bank in state  at date 1. The reason is that at
 = ∗ banks make the same expected profits with and without default and therefore
the comparison in welfare is exclusively determined by the amount of loans granted to
entrepreneurs at date 0 and thus by the aggregate reserves in the two equilibria. In
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equilibrium aggregate reserves must equal total demand for liquidity as given by 1 +
(1−) and 1 with and without default, respectively. Thus, since 1 = 1 = 1
at  = ∗, only the diﬀerence between  and 1 matters for welfare. When  
1 , the system needs more reserves in the mixed equilibrium than in the no default
one to repay all consumers withdrawing at date 1 in state . This implies lower loans in
aggregate, and thus lower welfare.
The sign of inequality (38) depends on the condition (23) that the expected profit of
safe and risky banks must be the same in equilibrium. Rearranging the expressions for Π
and Π as in (13) and (18) after substituting  as in (26) and  =  at  = ∗ gives
(1− )(1− 

1
 ) = 

1 + [(1− ) + (1− )(1− )] 2 − 2. (39)
The left hand side can be interpreted as the diﬀerence in the loan returns between a risky
and a safe bank. With probability 1 −  the bad state occurs and the risky bank loses
the return  on the loans while the safe bank loses  on the 1 units of loans that it
holds to meet the commitments to the early consumers in state . The right hand side
represents the diﬀerence in the repayments to consumers between a safe and a risky bank
other than those at date 1 in state . The first two terms are the expected repayments of
a safe bank to the early consumers in state  and to the late types in both states. The last
term is the expected repayment of a risky bank to early and late consumers in the good
state given that 1 = 2 =  at  = ∗. For (39) to hold, if the risky bank suﬀers a net
loss in terms of loan returns relative to a safe bank, it must benefit in terms of consumers’
repayments. It follows that the diﬀerence  − 1 is positive if the risky bank has a
cost advantage relative to the safe bank and it is negative if instead the risky bank has
higher net returns on loans.
The probability  of the good state aﬀects all terms in the expression (39) and thus
the sign of the diﬀerence  − 1 , as illustrated in the following proposition.
Proposition 7 Define  as the cutoﬀ value of the probability of state  such that  −
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1 = 0 at ∗ → 1. Then, if the diﬀerence  − 1 is decreasing in  (i.e.,
(−1 )  0), it is the case that:
i) If  ≤ , there exists a value b ∈ ( 1) such that at  = ∗ default leads to lower
welfare for   b and to higher welfare otherwise.
ii) If   , then at  = ∗ default leads to higher welfare for any  ∈ ( 1).
Insert Figure 1
The proposition highlights the importance of the probability of the good state, as
representing the inverse of the exogenous risk in the economy, for welfare. The results are
illustrated in Figure 1, which plots the welfare in the no default and mixed equilibrium
as a function of  for diﬀerent levels of . As the figure shows, the occurence of default
is more likely to lead to lower welfare in riskier economies, i.e., when 0  b. In this
case, at  = ∗, the welfare is higher in the no default equilibrium than in the mixed one
because in the latter more reserves are needed in aggregate to satisfy the higher consumers’
repayments in state . By contrast, in economies characterized by low risk, i.e., when
1  b, welfare is higher in the mixed equilibrium where default occurs.
The proposition requires that the diﬀerence  − 1 is decreasing in  to ensure
the uniqueness of the cutoﬀ values  and b. Unfortunately, it is not easy to prove the
monotonicity analytically. The consumption 1 increases with , but  is not monotonic
in . To see this, consider the derivative of  with respect to  as given by

 = −
( − 1)
( − )2 −
(1− )
( − )2 
∗
 .
The first term represents the (negative) direct eﬀect of a change in , while the second
term is the indirect one through a change in ∗. Since ∗  0, the second term becomes
positive and, depending on the value of , may dominate so that  is not monotonic in
. However, even when this is the case, as long as the indirect eﬀect is small enough, the
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monotonicity of  − 1 is guaranteed.
The previous result has implications for the comparison across diﬀerent equilibria, as
shown in the following proposition.
Proposition 8 Take two (suﬃciently close) values 0 and 1 with 1  0 and define
(0) and  (1) as the welfare without default for 0 and with default for 1. Then,
(i) if 1 ∈ ( b), (0) ≥ (1) for  ∈ [∗(1) ∗(0)];
(ii) if 0 ∈ (b 1)  (1)  (0) for  ∈ [∗(1) ∗(0)]
Insert Figure 2
The proposition illustrates how the probability of the good state  influences the
relationship between competition, stability and welfare. The results are illustrated in
Figure 2, which plots the welfare in the two equilibria as a function of  for diﬀerent
values of . For a given , the value of  determines whether the equilibrium features
default or whether all banks behave safely. The higher  is, the smaller the threshold
value ∗ at which default starts occuring. As the figure shows, economies with a higher
probability of the good state are not always more eﬃcient. As long as  is below b,
increasing the probability of the good state from 0 to 1 reduces welfare as it induces
some banks to default. By contrast, when  is above b, default is eﬃcient and thus a
higher likelihood of the good state increases welfare further.
5 Implications
The model has several important implications in terms of the relationship between com-
petition, stability and eﬃciency. The first insight is that competitive banking systems
are more stable. When competition is intense, banks behave prudently. Each bank holds
enough reserves to insure itself against the risk of experiencing large liquidity shocks. This
is individually optimal as the opportunity cost of holding reserves is low when the credit
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market is competitive. This result is consistent with the findings in Berger and Bouw-
man (2009) that banks enjoying greater market power as a result of a process of mergers
and acquisitions are more likely to hold fewer reserves and grant more loans; and with the
finding in Petersen and Rajan (1995) that banks grant more loans as competition becomes
less intense.
The second insight of the model is that the cutoﬀ value of credit market competition
at which default emerges in equilibrium crucially depends on the level of the exogenous
risk in the economy. A low probability of experiencing large liquidity shocks increases
the opportunity cost of holding reserves and thus induces banks to behave imprudently,
even in more competitive credit markets. This implies a negative relationship between
exogenous and endogenous risk in the model in terms of the eﬀect of the magnitude of the
exogenous risk on banks’ incentives to default. The implication is that economies with
similar levels of competition may diﬀer in terms of stability depending on the level of
exogenous risk. The result may provide an explanation for the mixed empirical evidence
on the relationship between competition and stability.
The model also delivers some implications concerning the optimality and severity of
crises in terms of number of risky banks in the economy. When large liquidity shocks
are unlikely, more banks find it optimal to reduce their reserve holdings and bear the
consequences of default in the bad state. This implies less frequent but more severe
crises, and greater eﬃciency due to less market liquidity in the system. These findings are
consistent with the results in Acharya and Viswanathan (2011) that when expectations
of fundamentals are good banking systems are characterized by more severe crises due
to greater system-wide leverage, and in Acharya, Shin and Yorulmazer (2011) that bank
liquidity is countercyclical. Extending our reasoning to a more dynamic framework, our
results are also consistent with the observation, as reported in Castiglionesi, Feriozzi and
Lorenzoni (2010), that market liquidity has decreased over time during the boom phase
preceding the recent crisis.
Finally, the model has implications for credit availability. It shows that the amount of
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loans granted depends on both the degree of competition and the exogenous risk in the
economy. The relationship between competition and provision of loans is not clear-cut.
In risky economies with less competitive credit markets, stable banking systems where
all banks behave prudently exhibit greater credit availability than systems where some
banks default. In contrast, in economies that are less exposed to large liquidity shocks
and have a more competitive credit market, the opposite is true in that banking systems
with defaulting banks ensure greater loan provision than safe ones.
6 Concluding remarks
In this paper we have developed a simple model where banks face liquidity shocks and can
invest in liquid reserves and safe loans. The latter can be sold on an interbank market
at a price that depends on the demand and supply of liquidity. We have shown that two
types of equilibria exist, depending on the degree of credit market competition. In the
no default equilibrium, all banks are self suﬃcient as they hold enough reserves to always
meet their liquidity demands. In the mixed equilibrium, banks make very diﬀerent initial
investment choices. A group of banks, defined as risky, does not keep any reserves and
sell loans on the interbank market to satisfy their liquidity demands. In the state with
low liquidity shocks, they sell a part of their loans and make positive profits. In the other
state with large liquidity shocks, they sell all their loans and default. Thus, in the mixed
equilibrium default is observed with positive probability. The no default equilibrium exists
when competition in the credit market is intense, while the mixed equilibrium exists in
more monopolistic credit markets. This implies that competition is beneficial for financial
stability, but it is not necessarily welfare-enhancing. The mixed equilibrium is eﬃcient
when the economy is characterized by a suﬃciently low probability of large liquidity shocks,
as it allows the system to economize on reserves and increase credit availability.
The analysis is based on the assumption that banks compete for loans but are mo-
nopolist on the deposit market. An interesting extension is to consider deposit market
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competition as well. This would induce banks to provide better risk sharing to depositors
by increasing the consumption promised to early types.
We have also considered that in the mixed equilibrium consumers can observe the type
of bank they deposit at so that safe and risky banks oﬀer diﬀerent deposit contracts. If this
assumption was removed, there would be a pooling in deposit contracts and consumers
would be promised the same deposit terms irrespective of the type of bank. Despite guar-
anteeing depositors’ participation, this would lead to ex post diﬀerences among consumers
as those at the safe banks would enjoy a positive rent while those at the risky banks would
suﬀer a loss. This would in turn lower the desirability of default.
The assumption that banks’ type is observable to consumers guarantees also that the
safe banks remain solvent when the risky banks default. Removing this assumption would
also lead to the possibility of contagion across types of banks, in particular in the presence
of a large number of risky banks in the economy as this would cast further doubts on the
solvency of the remaining banks. This may lead banks to hold greater reserves initially
and to develop strategies to signal their types to their depositors. Modelling an economy
with unobservable types of banks would constitute an interesting future research topic.
We have assumed that default is costless as it does not entail any bankruptcy costs.
Despite this, we have shown that default is not always welfare eﬃcient as in some circum-
stances it can lead to lower credit availability. Introducing bankruptcy costs that are not
internalized by the individual banks would lower the desirability of default for the economy
as a whole. Introducing bankruptcy costs aﬀecting the recovery rate of consumers in the
case of default would increase the costs of default for the risky banks and would therefore
lower the value of competition beyond which default is observed.
A final remark regards the way we have modeled competition in the credit market
and in particular the fact that the demand by entrepreneurs is inelastic. An interesting
alternative specification would be to consider that the demand for loans decreases as the
interest rate increases. This would generate an additional trade-oﬀ between liquidity and
credit availability as it would limit the profitability for banks to extend loans depending
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on the degree of competition.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: The bank’s maximization problem is convex and since the
profit function is concave, it has a unique solution. In order to avoid default the bank
chooses to keep enough reserves to cover its demand for liquidity at date 1 in either state.
Given   , in equilibrium it must hold
 = 1 (40)
This implies that (4) is satisfied with equality in state  and with strict inequality
in state . It is easy to show that the only other binding constraint in equilibrium is
the consumers’ participation constraint as given by (7). Solving it with respect to 2, we
obtain
2 = −[
+(1−)(1−)+(1−)(1− ) ]
1  (41)
Substituting the expression for 2 and (40) into (2) gives
Π = (1− 1) + ( − )1 − [(1− ) + (1− )(1− )]−
+(1−)(1−)+(1−)(1− )
1 
Diﬀerentiating this with respect to 1, we obtain
− + ( − ) + [ + (1− ) ]−
1
(1−)+(1−)(1− )
1 = 0
from which 1 as (8) in the proposition. Substituting (8) into (41) gives 2 as in (9)
in the proposition. ¤
Proof of Proposition 2: We derive the vector {    1  2    1  2    }
characterizing the mixed equilibrium as the solution to the maximization problem of the
safe and risky banks, the market clearing conditions and the equality between the expected
profit of risky and safe banks. In the banks’ maximization problems the only binding con-
straints are the consumers’ participation constraints given by (17) and (22). It can be
shown that all other constraints representing the resources constraints at dates 1 and 2
are satisfied with strict inequality.
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Consider first the maximization problem for the safe banks. Using the Lagrangian,
this can be written as
L = Π −  [[ + (1− ) ](1) + [(1− ) + (1− )(1− )](2)] 
The first order conditions with respect to the reserves  1 , 2 and  are as follow:

 +
1− 
 = 1 (42)
∙
 +
(1− )

¸
 = −

1
[ + (1− ) ] (43)
2 = − (44)
[ + (1− ) ](1 ) + [(1− ) + (1− )(1− )](2 ) = 0 (45)
Consider now the maximization problem of the risky banks. Using the Lagrangian,
this becomes
L = Π −  £[(1 ) + (1− )(2 )] + (1− )[( + (1−))]¤ 
The first order conditions with respect to the reserves  1 , 2 and  are as follows:
− +  =
(1− )(1− )
 + (1−) (46)

 = −

1
(47)
2 = − (48)
[(1 ) + (1− )(2 )] + (1− )[( + (1−))] = 0 (49)
The equilibrium is the solution to the system of all the first order conditions together
with (24), (25) and (23).
We solve the system by first using (42) to derive  as in (31). Then, we derive 
as in (26) from (24). Using (44), (43) and (45) after substituting (31) gives 1 and 2 as
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in (27) and (28) in the proposition.
Using (47) and (48), we can express 1 as in (29) in the proposition and  from (46)
as
 = (1− )

1
( − 1) −

1−   (50)
Substituting  from (31) into (50) and rearranging it gives
 = (1− )( − 1)(

1 − ) ≤ 0
for any  − 1  1 and 1 −  ≤ 0. The former follows from (31), as otherwise  
1  . This contrasts with the equilibrium where    must hold as there is more
excess of liquidity in state  than in state . The latter, 1 −  ≤ 0 follows from the
fact that the profits of the risky banks must be non-negative in equilibrium. To see this,
we rewrite (18) as follows:
Π = 
∙
 +
µ
1
 − 1
¶
 − (1− )2 − 

1
 
¸

As
³
1
 − 1
´
  0 for   1, Π ≥ 0 requires
 − (1− )2 − 

1
   0
Rewriting  as  + (1− ) and rearranging the terms gives
(1− )( − 2 ) + ( − 

1
 ) (51)
This is positive if −1  0 as this implies also that −2  0. Consider −1  0.
Then, from (48), it is 2   and (51) is negative. Then, in equilibrium − 1  0 must
hold. It follows that t then follows that  = 0 as in the proposition.
To find 2 as in the proposition we first rearrange Π = Π from (23) as
 [−1+ +
1− 
 ]−
∙
 +
(1− )

¸
1+(1−)+2 −[(1−)+(1−)(1−)]2 = 0
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From (42) it is [−1 +  + 1− ] = 0. From (43) it holds
∙
 +
(1− )

¸
1 = [ + (1− ) ]2 .
Substituting these into the expression above for Π − Π, we have 2 as in (30) in the
proposition.
Finally, from (22), (24) and (26), we have  and  as in (32) in the proposition. ¤
Proof of Lemma 1: The maximization problem of the deviating bank is the same
as the one of the risky banks in the proof of Proposition 2. The first order conditions
with respect to the reserves  1 , 2 and  are as (46), (47), (48) and (49). The only
diﬀerence is that  =  and thus  = (1−)− . The solutions to the first order conditions
are:
 = 0 (52)
1 = 2 =  = ()−
(1−)
 =
µ(1− )
 − 
¶− (1−)
. (53)
The lemma follows. ¤
Proof of Proposition 3: Substituting (52) and (53) into (33) gives
Π = ( − ). (54)
Deviating is profitable if and only if Π ≥ Π, where Π is as in (10). Define
( ) = Π −Π. When  → 1 and  → 1, ( )→ 0 since from (8), (9) and (53),
1 = 2 =  → 1. Diﬀerentiating ( ) with respect to  gives
( )
 =
Π
 −
Π

where Π
 =  (1− 

1 )  0
Π
 = 
µ
1− (1− )

( − )
¶
 0
The profits Π and Π are monotonically increasing in . For  → 1 , () →
 (1 − )  0. Thus, there exists a unique threshold ∗ ∈ ( 1  1) such that ( ) =
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Π − Π = 0 if and only if ( ) ≤ 0 for  → 1. A suﬃcient condition is that  is
suﬃciently high. To see this, we first show that ( ) is monotonically decreasing in .
Diﬀerentiating ( ) with respect to  gives
( )
 = −( − 
)− 

2
 + 

  (55)
where
2
 = ( − )

2
∙
ln
µ + (1− )
 + ( − )
¶
+
( − 1)
 + ( − )
¸


 = −


∙
1
 ln
µ  − 
(1− )
¶
−  − 1
( − )
¸

For  → , 2 → 0. The sign of  is negative if the diﬀerence in the square
bracket is positive. It is easy to see that such a diﬀerence is increasing in  and it equals
zero for  → 1. This implies   0 for any   1. Also, it then holds that ()  0
for any . Given the monotonicity of ( ) in , there exists a value  such that
( ) = Π − Π = 0 for  → 1 and ( )  0 for  → 1 for any   . The
proposition follows. ¤
Proof of Proposition 4: Recall that in the mixed equilibrium Π = Π and note
from (18) that Π increases with  for any given . Moreover, Π = Π and Π = Π
when  = . Thus, as Π = Π at  = ∗ and Π = Π in the mixed equilibrium, it
must also hold Π = Π = Π = Π at  = ∗. Consider now a value of   ∗, where
Π  Π from Proposition 3. It follows that Π¯¯=  Π ¯¯=  For Π = Π to
hold as required in the mixed equilibrium, it must then be   . Consider now a value
of   ∗, where Π  Π from Proposition 3. It follows that Π¯¯=  Π ¯¯= 
Thus, it must be    for Π = Π . It follows that the mixed equilibrium exists only
for  ≥ ∗. ¤
Proof of Proposition 5: Recall that ∗ is the solution to ( ) = Π −Π = 0,
where Π and Π are given respectively by (10) and (54). The solution depends on 
and, from the implicit function theorem, ∗ = −()()  The numerator is the same
as (55), which is negative for  → . So the sign of ∗ is given by the sign of the
denominator ( ). As shown in the proof of Proposition 3, ( )  0 for
 → 1 , and ( )  0 in the range of  where ∗ exists. Thus, 
∗
  0, as in the
proposition. ¤
Proof of Proposition 6: Diﬀerentiating the expression for  in (32) with respect to
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 and rearranging it gives

 = ( − )
∙
1 (

1 − )
 −
1
 (

1 − )
¸

Diﬀerentiating 1 as in (27) with respect to  after substituting  =  at  = ∗ gives
1
 = ( − )

1
∙
ln
µ + (1− )
 + ( − )
¶
− [(1− ) + (1− )(1− )]( − 1)
[ + ( − ) ] [ + (1− ) ]
¸
+
− [(1− ) + (1− )(1− )]
[ + ( − ) ]
∗
 

1 
which is positive for  → . Thus, a suﬃcient condition to have   0 is that(1 −)  0, which holds because of the concavity of consumers’ utility functions. ¤
Proof of Lemma 2: Substituting the expressions for  and  from (40) and
(26) into (36) and (37), we have
 − = 2 − 2 + ( − )
£1 + (1− ) − 1 ¤  (56)
At  = ∗ when  = , with 1 = 1 = 1 and 2 = 2 = 2 , (56) simplifies to
 −  = ( − )(1− )(1 − )
The lemma follows. ¤
Proof of Proposition 7: We first define the cutoﬀ value . From (31) and (8),
diﬀerentiating the diﬀerence  − 1 with respect to  at  = ∗ = 1 gives:
( − 1 )
 = −
 ( − 1)
( − )2 − ( − )

1
∙
ln
µ  + (1− )
 + ( − )
¶
+
− [(1− ) + (1− )(1− )] ( − 1)
[ + (1− ) ] [ + ( − ) ]
¸

For  → , it is (−1 )  0. Thus it exists a unique solution for the equation
 − 1 = 0 at  = ∗ defined as  such that  − 1 ≥ 0 for  ≤  and
 − 1  0 for   .
(i) If  ≤ , then  − 1 ≥ 0 at  = ∗ = 1. For  → 1,  − 1  0. From
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(31) and (8), diﬀerentiating  − 1 with respect to  at any ∗  1 gives:
( − 1 )
 = −
( − 1) + (1− ) ∗
( − )2 − ( − )

1
∙
ln
µ + (1− )
 + ( − )
¶
+
− [(1− ) + (1− )(1− )] ( − 1)
[ + (1− ) ] [ + ( − ) ]
¸
+
−1 [(1− ) + (1− )(1− )] ( − 1)[ + ( − ) ] 
∗
 
where ∗  0 from Proposition 5. For  → , the expression simplifies to
( − 1 )
 = −
( − 1)
( − )2 +
µ
−(1− )
( − )2 + (1− )
1

¶
 
∗
 .
Assuming −(1−)
(−)2  
∗
 is suﬃciently small, (−

1 )  0. Then, there exists a valueb ∈ ( 1) such that  − 1 ≥ 0 for any  ≤ b and  − 1  0 otherwise. From
Lemma 2, part (i) of the proposition follows.
ii) If   , then  − 1  0 at ∗ = 1, and, given the monotonicity assumption,
it remains negative for all admissible values of . Part (ii) of the proposition follows. ¤
Proof of Proposition 8: We proceed in steps. We first show that the welfare 
in the no default equilibrium is increasing in  and in . Then, we compare the welfare
without default with the one with default in the interval [∗(1) ∗(0)] depending on
whether 1 ∈ ( b) or 0 ∈ (b 1).
Diﬀerentiating the expression for welfare without default as in (36) with respect to 
gives

 = −
2
 − ( − )
1
 
Using the expressions for 1 and 2 as in Proposition 1, we obtain
1
 = (−)

1
∙
ln
µ + (1− )
 + ( − )
¶
− [(1− ) + (1− )(1− )]( − 1)
[ + ( − ) ] [ + (1− ) ]
¸
 0
and 2
 = −( − )

2
∙
ln
µ + ( − )
 + (1− )
¶
− ( − 1) + ( − )
¸

The sign of 

2 is negative if the diﬀerence in the square bracket is positive. It is
easy to see that such a diﬀerence is increasing in  and it equals zero for  → 1. This
implies 

2  0 for any   1. It follows that   0.
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Diﬀerentiating (36) with respect to  and rearranging it gives

 =  ( − )
2
(1− ) + (1− )(1− )
 + ( − ) 

1  0.
(i) Given that   0, we only need to compare (0) and (1) at  =
∗(1). At  = ∗(1), 1 (1) = 1 (1) = 1 (1) and 2 (1) = 2 (1) = 2 (1) so
that the diﬀerence between welfare without and with default simplifies to
(0)−(1) = 2 (1)−2 (0)+(−)
h

³
1 (1)− 1 (0)
´
+ (1− )
i

For 1 → 0, 2 (1)→ 2 (0) and 1 (1)→ 1 (0). Then, the sign of(0)−
(1) is given by the diﬀerence  − 1 (0), which is positive if 1 ∈ ( b) from
Proposition 7. Part (i) of the proposition follows.
(ii) It holds from Proposition 7 that(1)  (1) for  ∈ (b 1). This, together
with   0, implies part (ii) of the proposition. ¤
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 Figure 1: W
elfare as a function of the degree of credit m
arket com
petition and of the probability of the good 
state. The figure plots the w
elfare function in the no default equilibrium
 (W
N
D) and in the m
ixed equilibrium
 (W
M) for 
different values of the probability of the good state (π
0 , π and π
1 ) as a function of the degree of com
petition γ. For each 
value of π, the figure show
s the threshold value γ
* below
 w
hich the no default equilibrium
 exists and above w
hich the 
m
ixed equilibrium
 exists.	  
	  
Figure 2: C
om
parison of w
elfare across different values of the probability of the good state as a function of the 
degree of credit m
arket com
petition. The figure plots the w
elfare function in the no default equilibrium
 (W
N
D) and 
in the m
ixed equilibrium
 (W
M) for different values of the probability of the good state (π
0 , ! and π
1 ) as a function of 
the degree of com
petition γ. The figure highlights the areas w
here w
elfare is com
pared for different values of π. 
  
 
